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a b s t r a c t
Machine learning (ML) provides us with numerous opportunities, allowing ML systems to adapt to
new situations and contexts. At the same time, this adaptability raises uncertainties concerning the
run-time product quality or dependability, such as reliability and security, of these systems. Systems
can be tested and monitored, but this does not provide protection against faults and failures in adapted
ML systems themselves. We studied software designs that aim at introducing fault tolerance in ML
systems so that possible problems in ML components of the systems can be avoided. The research
was conducted as a case study, and its data was collected through five semi-structured interviews
with experienced software architects. We present a conceptualisation of the misbehaviour of ML
systems, the perceived role of fault tolerance, and the designs used. Common patterns to incorporating
ML components in design in a fault tolerant fashion have started to emerge. ML models are, for
example, guarded by monitoring the inputs and their distribution, and enforcing business rules on
acceptable outputs. Multiple, specialised ML models are used to adapt to the variations and changes
in the surrounding world, and simpler fall-over techniques like default outputs are put in place to
have systems up and running in the face of problems. However, the general role of these patterns
is not widely acknowledged. This is mainly due to the relative immaturity of using ML as part of a
complete software system: the field still lacks established frameworks and practices beyond training
to implement, operate, and maintain the software that utilises ML. ML software engineering needs
further analysis and development on all fronts.
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Machine learning (ML) has pierced through the society. A
L system aims at improving its behaviour through experi-
nce (Mitchell, 2006). Essentially, this means that a program
earns to give correct outputs for given inputs without explic-
tly being programmed to do so. Learning algorithm and large
mounts of training data are used to tune a statistical model that
epresents the problem field. Its ability to adapt and predict sit-
ations its developers never thought of presents unprecedented
ossibilities. However, this adaptability raises questions concern-
ng the run-time quality or dependability (IEEE, 2006), such as
eliability and security, of systems utilising ML: Can we trust the
ystems? How? Not only does the adaptability propose potential
roblems but a great deal of the time, the used ML models make a
ight prediction, for example, 99% of the time (Ramanathan et al.,
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the remaining 1%? And where do these inputs lie? In addition,
an ML model often keeps on learning after deployment, possibly
distancing itself from the initial tested ML model (Amershi et al.,
2019), leaving new features untested.
Research on ML dependability has mostly focused on testing
ML models, and less on the whole systems that utilise ML (Zhang
et al., 2020). The latter includes how the systems should be
monitored once ML models have been deployed. Along with test-
ing, verification, and validation of systems, the methods applied
upon and after deployment of the ML systems are vital to ensure
the systems remain dependable. Architectural designs have been
suggested to protect the systems from hardware failures and
malicious attacks (e.g. Kriebel et al., 2018), but there is little
emphasis on architectural software design to answer the inherent
unpredictability and uncertainty of the utilised ML itself.
One step towards achieving dependability is fault tolerance.
Traditionally, software faults have been seen as the results of
design errors (Randell, 1975). However, due to their statistical,
data-driven nature, ML systems can be seen as inherently faulty
not by design, but by paradigm. Thus, unpredictable errors will
emerge from deployed ML systems that cannot be captured byrticle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).






















































traditional fault-tolerance models. The question remains of how
to build ML systems that detect these errors and prevent them
from propagating.
However, reports on empirical experience are rare in the re-
earch literature related to fault tolerance in ML systems (Zhang
t al., 2020). As such, in this paper, the goal is to gather additional
nowledge on fault tolerance solutions and beyond, and the prac-
ical applicability and reasoning of the solutions — which are used
nd considered useful. We reached out to experienced software
rchitects familiar with ML through their work. In this way, we
im to shed light on which design solutions are seen as useful by
xperts, which are not, and which need additional studying, thus
nswering the lack of research on the functionality of deployed
L models identified by Zhang et al. (2020).
The applied research method is the case study method (Yin,
009; Runeson and Höst, 2009). The data was collected through
ive semi-structured interviews. The respondents were asked about
heir experiences with the fault-tolerant design of ML systems
n general, and their experiences with an initial set of design
olutions found in the ML research literature or presented in
aterials on fault tolerance in traditional software. This initial set
s presented in more detail in Section 3.
The results show that there is much to desire in the depend-
bility of ML systems. Some patterns for fault tolerance are used
n practice, but the developers and buyers often lack knowledge
nd frameworks to apply them. Thus, the role of fault tolerance
s – at least today – very limited and vague in practice. This
elative immaturity is not limited to fault tolerance, however,
ut also other phases of managing the life-cycle of ML systems.
o our knowledge, this is the first attempt to gather information
bout fault tolerance for ML systems in one place, thus forming
he basis for further research. Practitioners can use the gathered
nformation to design more dependable ML systems.
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the key
oncepts for fault tolerance, and the previous work on fault tol-
rance and the dependability of ML systems. Section 3 describes
he fault-tolerance solution proposals presented in literature and
tudied empirically in this study. The case study research method
etails are given in Section 4. The results of the interviews are
escribed in Section 5. Section 6 and Section 7 discuss the results
nd study validity. Conclusions are drawn in Section 8.
. Background
.1. Dependability, faults, and ML systems
System dependability means a system’s trustworthiness (IEEE,
006). Dependability is assessed by evaluating a system’s reliabil-
ty, availability, and maintainability. Sometimes additional quality
haracteristics, such as safety and integrity, are applied (Avizienis
t al., 2004). In other words, a dependable system – at the very
east – delivers correct service consistently, does not suffer from
ong periods of down-time, and is easily corrected and altered.
Threats to dependability originate from failures, errors, and
aults (Avizienis et al., 2004). Failures are deviations from the
esired service. Failures result from propagating errors, i.e., incor-
ect functioning of the system. Errors are caused by faults that are
efects in system’s components (software or hardware), activated
y given inputs in a given state.
Dependability can be reached by diminishing these threats
r by justifying that the remaining threats in the system do
o unbearable harm (Avizienis et al., 2004). Two means of di-
inishing threats are fault prevention and fault tolerance. Fault
revention aims at not introducing faults into systems, whereas
ault tolerance aims at a system design such that occurring errors
re stopped from propagating and causing system failures.2
As ML models are non-deterministic statistical approximations
by their nature, they are bound to function completely correctly
only a certain portion of the time (Ramanathan et al., 2016).
Thus, fault prevention – essentially building a more accurate ML
model – works only to a degree. This is true even if there are
no design flaws present in the software. This is noteworthy, as
design flaws are seen as the main source of faults in traditional
software (Randell, 1975).
As faults are inherently possible or even present in ML models,
preventing ML system failures cannot rely solely on fault preven-
tion, but dependable ML systems also require fault tolerance. In
software systems, fault tolerance is achieved by error detection
and error recovery (Knight, 2012). Essentially this means that
activating faults must be noticed and the resulting errors must
be stopped from propagating.
Research on fault tolerance has been carried out more on
traditional systems rather than those with a ML model. This
is insufficient, as the deployment of ML models into software
systems introduces challenges beyond the shortcomings of the
initial model (Lwakatare et al., 2020). In a typical project, a new
ML model needs to be developed and tested. At the same time,
all the other software of the system needs to be developed and
operated just like in traditional software projects. However, the
system is not just about the functioning of the ML model and
the software around it but also about them working together
as a ML-based system that brings special characteristics. System
or integration testing cannot be carried out satisfactorily before
the ML model is deployed. To test the system sufficiently, the
developers need to assess how the ML model’s requirements and
evaluation affect the requirements and evaluation of the entire
system. Beyond the initial version, the ML model is usually not
only trained and deployed once but needs to be retrained with
new data, possibly gathered by the live system, while there is
still no real way of knowing whether or not the retrained model is
functioning adequately before it is deployed to the system, either.
Thus, updating the system may introduce a new version of the
code, a new version of the data, and a new version of the model,
all of which may introduce faults, and at least one of which one
cannot really be sure of beforehand. Compare this to traditional
software, where updating only introduces a new version of the
code, and should not contain components as whimsical as ML
models in the first place. The solution principles themselves are
nothing new: ensuring the continuation of correct functioning is
seen as part of the life-cycle of ML software (Zhang et al., 2020;
Breck et al., 2017). However, there has been more interest in
the correct functionality of the initial ML model than in making
sure it keeps delivering correct service during its operational
time (Zhang et al., 2020).
2.2. Previous work
ML has been shown to be problematic when applied in prac-
tical systems, and dependability is no exception. In their litera-
ture review on software engineering challenges for ML systems,
Kumeno (2019) found that software maintenance and software
quality (including run-time monitoring, fault detection, fault cor-
rection, and fault elimination, among other things) are amongst
the often-reported challenges around ML faced in the software
engineering literature. Thus, the problem is well-recognised in
the field.
There have been efforts to grasp this problem. In their litera-
ture review, Zhang et al. (2020) take a deep dive into the testing
of ML in the research literature. In their work, they separate ML
testing into offline and online testing. Offline testing is basically
ML model validation (Wang and Zheng, 2013), whereas online
testing includes the initial testing after model deployment, and

































































































the measures taken to ensure correct functionality beyond ini-
tial tests, such as monitoring and other fault tolerant patterns.
However, the papers yielded by their search presented mostly
offline testing, and very little online testing. For this reason,
they point out that more research is needed on the elements of
online testing. As the term online testing also includes the initial
testing after deployment, to avoid confusion, we refer to post-
deployment measures as a whole as continuous validation, when
not specifically talking about fault tolerance.
We are aware of studies, which include solutions what we
understand as continuous validation in their system description.
Some specifically mention some software fault-tolerance mea-
sures. The measures include input checker (Jonsson et al., 2012),
utput checker (Prado et al., 2018; Li et al., 2017), replication (Yan
t al., 2018), design diversity (Fu et al., 2019), and voting (Wang
t al., 2018). However, in many of these papers, the details of
he measures are not described very rigorously. The efficiency,
mplementation, or even need for them may not be reported.
ven their very existence may only be revealed in a sentence,
ever to be returned to. This leaves room for more descriptive
mpirical research on the role of fault tolerance in ML systems.
All of the mentioned patterns have their counterparts in the
ault-tolerant design of traditional software (cf. Knight, 2012). As
ault tolerance has an established role in traditional software,
t might be reasonable to assume that practitioners could have
aken even more inspiration from the patterns used in tradi-
ional software. For this reason, additional solution proposals are
aken from the realm of traditional software, specifically Knight’s
xtensive report (Knight, 2012).
In addition, there has been interest in node activation ob-
erving as a testing approach for ML models, more specifically
rtificial neural networks (NN) (Pei et al., 2017; Tian et al., 2018;
ie et al., 2019). As the results indicate that different kinds of
nputs tend to activate different nodes (Tian et al., 2018; Xie et al.,
019), it could be the case that unexpected activations could not
nly be used in testing but could also be used to indicate invalid
nputs or untrustworthy results when the model is deployed.
This overview of previous work led us to summarise the
olution proposals as described in more detail below in Section 3.
. Study propositions: Fault tolerance solutions
The case study propositions (Yin, 2009) represented in this
ection direct the attention to fault tolerance solutions that are
hen examined within the scope of this study. That is, since some
olutions – or patterns – have been mentioned in the literature
see Section 2.2), and there is a tradition for fault tolerance in
raditional software, we aim then in the case study to gather more
n-depth empirical insight into how these solutions are perceived
y software architects working on ML systems.
.1. Solution proposals selection
The patterns chosen are either mentioned in earlier research
n the context of ML, presented in materials for traditional soft-
are, or are a modification of some of these solutions which we
erceived to be interesting (cf. Section 2.2). To be included in the
ropositions, one of two criteria had to be met:
1 A paper mentioned using the said pattern in a ML system,
or
2 The pattern is used for traditional software, and we can
come up with a scenario in which the pattern could poten-
tially detect errors, or stop them from propagating in a ML
system.3
n other words, the solutions were chosen based on our per-
eption of whether or not the mentioned solutions could be
een as fault-tolerance design and whether or not we thought
hey could potentially be interesting in the context of ML. For
xample, replication (see below) was included as a proposition
ased on criterion 1, as it was briefly mentioned being used in
paper, whereas very similar N-copy voting (Knight, 2012) was
eft out, as we could not really see how the same model voting
ith itself would provide any additional value for a ML system.
he exception to this is activation observing, which arises from
he inner workings of neural networks, but is only hinted at in
arlier research (Tian et al., 2018). The solutions discussed in
his paper are described below as they were initially presented.
his means that modifications and additional suggestions made
o them by the respondents of the case study are presented later.
ikewise, the case study is not limited to these proposals, but the
espondents were encouraged to describe their experiences first –
efore the propositions were presented to them – to supplement
he set, and also to reject propositions they did not feel had
dditional value. Thus, the list presented in this section should
ot be viewed as complete.
.2. Fault-tolerance solution proposals
Input checker (used by Jonsson et al., 2012) is a component
hat aims to prohibit such inputs from entering the ML model that
ould activate the ML model’s faults. Thus, the faults are tolerated
y limiting the potential situations in which they could cause
rrors. This can be done by strict limitations to the environment
n which the system is deployed (as in Shadrin et al. (2019)) but,
s we are interested in software design, we emphasise the so-
utions in which the potentially unwanted inputs are recognised
n the software level. Limitations can be strict sets or values as
n the paper by Jonsson et al. (2012), but in addition to this, we
nclude an input checker that aims to recognise inputs which are
ot similar to anything the ML model has seen before, henceforth
eferred to as novelty inputs.
Output checker (used by Prado et al., 2018 and Li et al., 2017,
lso known as acceptance test Knight, 2012) is a component
hich detects errors by assessing ML model’s outputs and pre-
ents errors from propagating further into other parts of the
ystem. For example, Prado et al. (2018) set the software to limit
he speed and steering angle of an electric vehicle to certain max-
ma, no matter what the ML-based controller output. In addition
o this hard limit approach, we include whether errors of a ML
odel could be detected by comparing the outputs to historical
ata or by using another ML model, trained to detect unexpected
ehaviour of the primary ML model.
Model observing means measures taken to assess the inner
orkings of a ML model during the operation time. Thus, the ML
odel’s trustworthiness is based on whether or not it acts un-
xpectedly, regardless of its outputs’ perceived correctness. This
overs timer watchdogs (Knight, 2012): the watchdog barks if the
omputations done by the ML suddenly take significantly more
r less time. However, we expand the idea of a timer watchdog
o include other resources, such as CPU usage, and call these
ollectively resource consumption. Also, we suggest an activation
bserver (e.g. another ML model trained for the task) to watch if
he input given to the ML model activates unexpected nodes. This
ould be, for example, a node which has always before output
mall numbers and suddenly outputs a considerable number, or
ctivation of a node which has usually only activated in relation
o certain input features.
Redundancy is a collection of approaches which rely on mul-
iple implementations of the same component, which would be
edundant if fault-freedom of the first implementation could be









































assured (Knight, 2012). We present different forms of redundancy
as follows.
The first form of redundancy is recovery blocks (Knight, 2012).
his is organised so that if the first ML model is detected to be
rroneous, the input is passed on to another ML model. If the
ther ML model is also detected to be erroneous, the input can
e passed on to a third one and so on as long as there are more
edundant ML models to pass the input on to. Recovery blocks
an be set up by replication (Knight, 2012; Yan et al., 2018) or
design diversity (Knight, 2012; Fu et al., 2019). In replication, the
software components – in our case, the ML model – to which the
inputs are passed on are other instances of the initial ML model;
in other words, its replicas. The system was not described in great
detail – rather mentioned than described – nor could we really
come up with appropriate scenarios for it. Nevertheless, it was
included based on criterion 1 so that experienced practitioners
could potentially enlighten us on the situation. In design diversity,
the secondary ML models, to which the input is passed on if
the primary ML model is erroneous, are not instances of the
primary ML model but different ML models altogether, trained
for the same task. The secondary models could, for example, be a
less refined, yet more robust or tested version, a simpler version
dedicated to keeping the system alive, or just a plainly different
model, the shortcomings of which hopefully do not overlap with
the primary model. All these might risk the secondary model
sharing the same defects, or even having more broad ones. We
hope to find answers to this problem as well. We also considered
whether or not the primary ML model should be disabled and a
new primary ML model should be chosen amongst the redundant
ML models if the primary ML model is detected to be erroneous.
Another form of redundancy is voting (briefly mentioned as
eing used by Wang et al. (2018), also known as N-version
ystems (Knight, 2012)). In voting, different ML models decide
he outcome together. Thus, the errors of a single or a few ML
odels can be masked, as long as the majority of the ML models
re functioning correctly. Voting relies on design diversity, as
nstances of the same ML model can be expected to give similar
utputs in all other cases than in the case of malformation. Knight
2012) mentions majority voting, median value, middle value, and
verage value as examples of heuristics that can be used as the
ecider for which value should be chosen. The voting could be
rganised by the data scientists applying ensemble learning, but
e did not want to rule out less strategic approaches a priori, but
ather hear what the practitioners said. For example, the models
articipating in the vote could include an orchestra of models
sed in practice over time, or they could include – or even consist
f – off-the-shelf-models acquired elsewhere.
As voting and the divergent form of recovery blocks rely on
esign diversity, we also take into account how this diversity can
e achieved with ML models. In traditional software, diversity
as been implemented by using different development teams,
evelopment tools, design techniques, and older versions of the
oftware (Knight, 2012). Gong et al. (2019) found that in prior
esearch, diversity between different ML models has been en-
ouraged by using different subsets of training data for each ML
odel, by enforcing diversity through additional regularisation
etrics during training, and by training multiple ML models for
he same task and choosing a number of the top performing ones.
owever, they do not disclose how the data was gathered, which
aises questions about the coverage of the work, and they ap-
roach the issue from the perspective of ML model performance
ather than that of fault tolerance. Thus, we are interested in the
atter not only to unveil the state-of-practice and preference of
hese methods, but also to find out whether or not there are more
uitable methods to ensure the desired level of diversity — and
hat the desired level is.
4
4. Methodology
The research methodology of this paper is a case study (Yin,
2009; Runeson and Höst, 2009). That is, the phenomenon is stud-
ied in its real context. The chosen approach for data collection is
an interview study: We interviewed multiple respondents about
their experiences on several industrial projects in an exploratory
manner.
4.1. Research goal and questions
As discussed in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, there is a justified con-
cern about the misbehaviour of ML systems. How the inherent
problems actually manifest and are handled after deployment
is, however, a less prominent subject in the research literature.
There is evidence that some fault tolerance is present in the
research literature, but the details and actual implications the
patterns have on the systems are often vague. Our research goal
is to capture what fault tolerance patterns are used or considered
useful. Thus, we reached out to practitioners with experience
on the matter to gather information both on how the problems
manifest, and how they are handled. In this paper, we seek
answers to the following questions:
• RQ1: What kind of misbehaviour occurs in ML systems,
originating from the ML model?
• RQ2: What is the role of fault tolerance as a means to
diminish this misbehaviour?
• RQ3: What design patterns are useful to build fault-tolerant
ML software?
The aim of RQ1 is to survey how the ML models cause prob-
lems in software systems. As for RQ2, we aim to find out what
kind of a role fault tolerant design patterns have in ensuring the
proper functioning of the systems. RQ3 is for understanding how
fault tolerance should be utilised. If we desire to build better
systems, knowing whether or not fault tolerance is seen as useful
is not enough in itself, but we also need to know how to do it.
Whereas appropriate measures could improve the trustworthi-
ness of the systems, inappropriate ones would just add costs, or
worse, add to the misbehaviour. While all the research questions
were approached openly regarding the respondents perceptions,
RQ3 also studied the concrete propositions presented in Section 3
although we were not limited to these propositions.
4.2. Unit of analysis and case selection
We designed the study as a multi-case design. We asked
several respondents about their experiences over the years on
several different projects they had been involved in rather than,
for example, only the most recent or successful project. Thus,
our unit of analysis covered several respondents, each respondent
covering several different projects. While the focus on several
projects had the risk of abstraction and missing the holistic view,
our research questions focus on discovering the existence and
prevalence of characteristics stated in the RQs that can be better
covered over several projects. Finally, we focused our enquiry
on the respondents’ concrete industrial project experiences from
their projects rather than their opinions or general knowledge.
The respondents for the interviews were selected based on
existing academy-industry relations. However, each selected re-
spondent was primarily an experienced practitioner in the fields
of machine learning and software engineering with knowledge
of software design (see Table 1). In fact, none of the respon-
dents had, to the best of our knowledge, a strong academic
background, although they typically had an academic degree,
and two had some work experience in academia. Respectively,





































The experiences of the respondents.
Respondent Industrial experience in ML Application domains
1 20 years A few media houses, Telecommunication, Banking, Consulting.
2 5 years Product consulting, Education.
3 15 years Product and culture consulting, Research, Automotives, Telecommunication,
AutoML tools.
4 9 years Research, Data consulting, Media houses.
5 23 years data-intensive, 8
years of ML
Cloud analytics, Research, Business model consulting, ML framework
development and auditing.each respondent had at least been involved earlier in some as-
pects of engineering work in the projects rather than only in
a managerial role. All of the respondents had been involved in
several projects involving AI or machine learning over the years
either in different companies or in different projects for differ-
ent companies in the case of consultants. We treat the actual
projects as confidential information but all projects were con-
ducted within industry, rather than being academic prototypes,
and the project customers, which were established businesses,
included, but were not limited to, Finnish public authorities, large
media houses and companies in the banking sector (cf. Table 1).
As the problem has a direct practical use, it seemed appropriate to
gather the information from those who practice. All respondents
worked for Finnish companies with international operations at
the time of the interviews.
In total, five interviews were conducted. The number of inter-
iews was not predefined but we aimed at theoretical saturation
s used by Strauss &Corbin (Strauss and Corbin, 1994), meaning
hat in the last interviews no significant new insights emerged
ontributing to the research questions and study propositions, but
he results and their reasoning were similar and confirmatory to
arlier interviews. Thus, we decided not to carry out additional
nterviews. While the number of interviews remained quite small,
he interviews covered much larger number of projects, thus
eaching theoretical saturation.
.3. Data collection
The data was collected through semi-structured interviews
Runeson and Höst, 2009). The interviews included both open
nd closed questions but the questions and answers were not ex-
ected to follow a strict form, structure, or order. The interviews
ere conducted in October 2020. Interviews were recorded and
upplemented with memos written during the interviews.
A set of interview questions were designed beforehand. The
uestions – and the entire interview protocol – were carried
ut in two pilot interviews with a researcher as a respondent
sing a protocol similar to think-aloud protocol in usability test-
ng (Nielsen, 1994) in which the main interviewer asked the
uestions and the respondent rephrased how they understood
he question, what kind of answer would be given, and provided
eedback (Foddy and Foddy, 1994). The interview protocol was
efined based on the pilot interviews.
At the beginning of each interview, confidentiality and other
racticalities were agreed upon, the key concepts (as in Sec-
ion 2.1) were introduced, and the respondents were asked to
riefly give their background. The questions started with open
uestions, which would capture the respondents’ personal pref-
rences and experiences, then widening the scope with more
pecific and closed questions about single techniques in study
roposals (see Section 3) when the techniques were also in-
roduced. In this way, the respondents were given a chance
o describe their views freely, without the propositions giving
mplications of what we had in mind beforehand, thus supple-
enting our initial thoughts. The structure follows the order of
he research questions so that eventually for each technique in5
the proposals the respondent was asked i) whether the technique
makes sense, ii) whether the technique has been used, and (iii)
whether the technique could be used. Thus, the questions were of
an exploratory nature to gather empirical experiences about the
proposals allowing the respondents to express their perceptions.
The questions were presented to the respondents as is but
remarks made by earlier respondents were used to attain more
in-depth insights, when appropriate, as suggested by Runeson
&Höst (Runeson and Höst, 2009). A set of slides1 containing
the interview questions and study proposals (Section 3) were
prepared and shown to the respondents in order to facilitate
better communication. The interviews were carried out remotely
because of the on-going COVID-19 restrictions. Each interview
took roughly two hours.
4.4. Data analysis
The data analysis was conducted as a cross-case analysis
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). The data analysis was started after
each interview rather than waiting for all the interviews to be
finished. The interview notes and recordings were used as the
data for the analysis.
First, the data analysis identified and transcribed respondents’
experiences as quotations for the predefined research questions,
study propositions, and additional findings beyond these. Quota-
tions from respondents were collected in a concept matrix using
a spreadsheet. Each concept in the concept matrix occupied its
own row, and each respondent their own column (cf. Webster
and Watson, 2002). The initial concepts were the RQs and propo-
sitions for patterns for fault tolerance (see Section 3. When a
new concept (new pattern, important theme, etc.) emerged from
the interviews, a new row was added for it. Quotations from
the respondents were added to the cell in their column, which
corresponded to the concept that the comment was related to.
As the analysis progressed, iterations and refinements were done
throughout the concept matrix.
Second, after all the interviews had been analysed individually,
synthesis across interviews was carried out. Each concept was
analysed cross-case by adding summarising columns, providing
an overall view of each of them. For example, for a pattern for
fault tolerance, columns for overall impression and perceived
usefulness, upsides (pros), limitations (cons), suggestions for im-
plementation, and when to use it were added. The quotations
from the interviews were, thus, summarised and generalised in
the appropriate new columns.
5. Results
5.1. On misbehaviour of ML systems (RQ1)
The mentioned kinds of misbehaviour were unexpected input–
output pairs, poor quality of incoming data, and decay of the ML
model over time. The first could be considered the simplest kind
1 The slides are available in this link.














































of erroneous behaviour: with some inputs, the software gives
outputs that are inaccurate or just plainly wrong. In the second
kind, poor quality means that the input data is somehow broken
or incomplete: For example, if multiple input fields are empty or
contain null values, the model cannot be expected to give reliable
results. In the third kind, the model itself does not break, but the
distribution of the incoming data varies over time, and no longer
matches the training data, causing decay. This decay makes the
model – in a sense – obsolete. As one of the respondents stated,
‘‘prediction models predict the past’’, meaning that the models
base their results on what has happened before. Thus, if the world
changes around the model, the results may not be as good as they
were before. The change could be the result of, for example, a
change in demographics of the user base.
The errors were further divided into individual errors and
ystematic errors. Individual errors are errors, which just happen
ometimes or with certain inputs. Systematic errors mean that
he system always works incorrectly, with a considerable amount
f inputs, or with certain sub-problems.
All respondents emphasised that the severity of misbehaviour
s contextual. The most frequently mentioned indicator of prob-
ematic behaviour was how the misbehaviour reveals itself to
he user. For example, a medical appliance is to be expected
o give the best and most precise results, whereas for a video
ecommending system it is enough that the user is somewhat
atisfied. In the example, there are dire consequences the user
f a medical system – i.e. the patient – if the system performs
oorly, and thus, the tolerance for error is smaller than with the
ideo recommending system. However, the systems must give
utputs that are good enough. If the users are not satisfied with
he results, they will not come back, and if the content managers
f the company do not trust the model, the project is deemed a
ailure.
Misbehaviour is usually the result of faulty implementation,
isuse of the model’s results, or a poor or buggy model. The latter
s straightforward: the model produces erroneous results. When
he model has been implemented into the system in a faulty
anner, on the other hand, the model itself gives correct or
cceptable results but the software around it breaks the results.
ne mentioned example of this was an off-by-one-error, in which
very user of a platform received the predictions meant for the
revious user, thus getting results that were meaningless for
hem. And finally, the misuse of the model’s results stems from
ot understanding correctly what the model does. In this case,
he model gets proper inputs, functions correctly, and gives the
esults that should be expected, but the expectations are wrong
r misguided. Thus, the results are used for something that the
odel was not exactly built for.
Overall, the respondents raised the challenge that it may be
ifficult to notice problems. The problems may not be noticed
ntil the system is well into production, but the revenue just will
ot rise. This is particularly true when each feature seems to work
eparately, but their interaction causes problems.
.2. On the role of fault tolerance in ML software (RQ2)
The need for and role of fault tolerance was deemed to be con-
extual and varying. As mentioned earlier in Section 5.1, systems
ith direct consequences for the user – such as medical systems
are less forgiving than those with none: an error of a medical
evice can lead even to the death of a patient, while an error
n a video recommendation system means – as one respondent
ut it – ‘‘looking stupid’’ and is inconvenient for the service and
usiness. An addition to this – mentioned by two respondents
was the role of the human-in-the-loop: Until now, humans
ave been very much included in the decision-making process,6
but very recently, more and more critical parts of business have
given to automated systems to handle. This raises the value of
fault tolerance, as humans are not there to fix every problem
immediately. On the other hand, one respondent noted that their
system may register a user as a man and a woman at the same
time if they are interested in both sports and fashion, and this
has not caused significant problems in their prediction model.
Thus, in some cases, the fault activating might not just be that
dangerous.
However, according to the respondents, the fluctuation in the
role of fault tolerance is not only about what the system is
for, but also about the discipline. The field of ML systems was
seen as commercially quite immature – on both the side of the
producer and the buyer – lacking in established frameworks for
developing and maintaining ML systems as complete products.
This was discussed a great deal by the respondents. The lack of
established patterns and frameworks for developing, maintaining,
and producing ML-based systems was seen as something that
leads to varied and often insufficient practices, as everyone is
struggling to come up with their own approaches. In addition,
the customers often do not know enough of the field to demand
or desire fault tolerance or other kind of safety measures. Quite
the opposite: it was stated in the interviews that customers may
even become intimidated if fault tolerance, quality assurance, or
responsibility are brought up too early in the design phases, even
if this is needed when going into production. This was believed to
be due to the fact that the field is not yet commercially mature,
and the projects are not treated like complete software products
with proper requirements from the start.
According to the respondents, in addition to commercial im-
maturity, problems may arise from the fact that many data scien-
tists come from a purely academic background. For this reason,
the data scientist may lack knowledge of the commercial dis-
cipline of testing frameworks, continuous delivery, and other
common software engineering practices, despite the fact that
they often have to implement a great deal of traditional code
around the model. This way of working is not alleviated by the
perceived gap between data scientists and software engineers.
Software engineers may not want to participate in the ML side
of things, or even believe they cannot participate, while data
scientists may not realise that they are dealing with traditional
software around the model. In the resulting circumstances, the
data scientists and the software engineers may not notice that
they could benefit from each other.
5.3. Patterns used as fault tolerance (RQ3)
In this section, we present what the respondents thought
about the fault tolerance solutions as presented in the study
propositions in Section 3, along with the additional patterns the
respondents proposed themselves.
5.3.1. Input checker
Input checkers were rarely being used in practice. However,
there is use for input checkers, when certain conditions are met.
First of all, hard limits on inputs were seen – at best – as
an efficient way to prevent poor quality data from entering the
model. For example, broken data or data beneath or above some
threshold can be filtered out. It may be that the model cannot
handle null values, or its results may be unreliable if the user – for
example – has not watched enough videos for a recommendation.
In addition, business rules and other known problems can be
enforced with hard limitations on the inputs’ values, forcing the
inputs into a certain range. Hard limits on inputs can also be used
to map exceptionally high or low values to some maxima or min-
ima. For example, in the banking sector, there may not be prior

























































knowledge on how the model acts if the user has an exceptionally
high annual income, and it may be a better approach to map to
some specific number that is ‘‘high enough’’, yet known to work.
However, enforcing hard limits excessively was seen as prob-
ematic enough that the respondents warned to be cautious. First,
he limits may be based on wrong assumptions. If the assump-
ions are wrong, changes in the model or the incoming data may
reak the system, as valid inputs will not get through. Second,
echnical aspects could also turn out problematic. One mentioned
isk is that the Python programming language is often used in ML
rojects, and it does not have an inherent type-system. Instead,
he type of an input is inferenced during execution time. Thus, the
evelopers may believe they are limiting the inputs, but instead
nd up breaking or lowering the quality of the inputs.
Checking the inputs for novelty had been used by only one
espondent. They, however, considered the novelty check as ex-
remely useful, but not because they saw new kinds of inputs
s problematic in themselves, but because of the feedback value
f the novel inputs. The recognised novel inputs could be used
s training data later on, and also as indicators where previous
ata was potentially lacking. This is especially valuable, if training
ata has been difficult to come by. Other respondents were some-
hat curious about the idea but novelty checking was considered
hallenging, as recognising such inputs may be difficult.
.3.2. Input distribution observing
Input distribution observing was not one of the original study
ropositions was but, however, mentioned by every respondent.
he statistics of the inputs are measured over time, and devia-
ions in the statistics either alert the developers, or potentially
ead to some predefined actions being taken. As mentioned in
ection 5.1, changes in the world around the model can decay
he model’s performance. Changes in the distribution of incoming
ata can be a sign of forthcoming decay, and therefore, something
o keep an eye on. If the incoming data starts to differ from
he training data of the model, or the data the system had been
eceiving earlier, this may indicate problems ahead.
.3.3. Output checker
The respondents considered hard limits on outputs more use-
ul than their counterparts for inputs. Again, business rules or
asily confirmable erroneous outputs with direct consequences
o users are what set the rules for outputs. For example, business
xecutives might not even approve an autonomous pricing model,
hich has no limits on how high or low it can value the products.
oreover, the customer should not be able to recognise the
rroneous output: For example, it should probably not be possible
or the system to place two passengers on the same seat, or give
egative values for someone’s age.
However, beyond the situations mentioned above, the respon-
ents emphasised that hard limits should be avoided. Not only
an the limits be based on wrong assumptions, as is the case with
nput limits, but also, too many strict limitations can also limit the
odel’s capabilities. If one puts too many limits on the results the
odel can give, they might only get the results they want, and not
he ones they should get.
Using another ML model as an output checker raised interest
n the respondents. The model could, for example, predict the
rustworthiness of the output, and the output could be accom-
anied with information that the output may not be very certain.
owever, using another ML model has significant drawbacks in
erms of work efficiency, since the checker model should also be
alidated, and it might be difficult to train in the first place. The
raining and test data may be hard to acquire, and the acquisition
ay require breaking the model which is being checked, as the
raining of the checker model requires known erroneous results
or desired outputs.
7
One respondent presented a way to monitor outputs through
live confirmation. Basically, if there is a way to gather new, cer-
tainly trustworthy data, this data can be used to periodically
evaluate whether or not the model is still relevant. For example,
the respondent mentioned that they had a way of acquiring some
correct information through having registered users along with
unregistered ones. In this way, they could occasionally have the
model make predictions for registered users, and then compare
the predictions to the real values, acquired from their user profile.
5.3.4. Output distribution observing
Our study proposal of comparing outputs to historical data
was not triumphant when it concerned single outputs. Instead,
monitoring the distribution of outputs in a manner similar to
inputs in Section 5.3.2 is something that the respondents men-
tioned frequently. As with inputs, the distribution of outputs
is expected to remain more or less the same. For example, an
autonomous application for granting loans should not suddenly
approve 100% of the applications, if the approval rate was previ-
ously 50%. Comparing the distributions over time was considered
something that should be done more often than what is currently
being done. According to the respondents, at the moment, there is
a risk that due to the immaturity of the field, developers become
too easily satisfied if the outputs match the expected ones once,
and forget that the outputs should probably match time after
time.
The execution environment often defines whether or not dis-
tribution observing is possible when the model has been de-
ployed. It should be remembered that not every ML system is
executed in the cloud or another computation-rich environment,
where all the data is acquirable by the developers. They can also
be, for example, executed on someone’s personal device, from
where the output distributions may not be within the reach of
the developers.
5.3.5. Model observers
Measuring the resource consumption of the ML model was
mostly disregarded as a tool for fault tolerance for a ML system,
but was considered more as a development tool to indicate non-
optimal solutions when building an ML model. Alternatively,
model observers should be used as something to monitor the
execution environment instead of the model and are useful as
such considering the development process as a whole. However,
the respondents left a side-door ever so slightly ajar in the case
of self-learning systems: if the resource consumption metrics
started to get worse, the model could learn in a non-optimal way.
As for activation observers, the experiences were thin. Only
one respondent had – at least knowingly – used a technique
similar to the depicted one. According to them, the inner work-
ings are usually observed by a high-level library, which does not
necessarily state what it is observing exactly. Another respondent
had used an ad hoc visualisation of the inner workings of a
model in a somewhat similar manner. The rest of the respondents
showed interest in the idea, even though they were not aware of
such an approach being used.
However, activation observers also have drawbacks. First, the
respondent who had used activation observers considered them
labour-intensive. Observing the activations would require know-
ing specific details about the structure of the model and also
having access to the information for a single node’s activations.
This may not be possible later on in the development process
because data scientists often do not build the models as APIs
in such a way that would provide the information by merely
making function calls. Also, one respondent considered what
should actually be monitored to detect errors instead of design
flaws. A surprising node activation does indicate that there is an


















































exceptional situation, but not necessarily why it is exceptional.
It might just be saying that the used model is too big. On the
other hand, rarely activating nodes can also be seen as faults in
the model.
5.3.6. Redundant models
Having multiple divergent models as recovery blocks to hand
he inputs over to was seen as somewhat useful as a fall-over
pproach in case the main model not give any outputs, or if it was
ossible to detect erroneous outputs. However, when presented
ith the idea of having redundant models, the respondents were
ore inclined to have the system decide the used model based
n prior knowledge of the problem, instead of just reacting to
ad outputs. The design should be organised in such a way, that
ertain kinds of inputs would be given to certain models. For
xample, if two different models perform better on two different
inds of image encoding, a system that gets both kinds as inputs
ould always give them to the better suited one. This suggested
ariant of distributing the inputs to different models based on
rior knowledge will later be referred to as input switch.
When presenting the idea of redundancy, the respondents
ften mentioned the multi-armed bandit models approach (cf. Lat-
timore and Szepesvári, 2020), which was explicitly preferred
by two respondents over other approaches to redundancy. Es-
sentially, multiple models compete against each other in these
‘‘bandit models’’. Inputs are passed on to the models with just
some distribution, and over time, the best-performing models are
given a greater portion of the inputs, while the worst-performing
models essentially fade away. For example, if a user clicks a rec-
ommendation, the model is seen as successful, and the frequency
of inputs directed to that model can be increased. The problem
of the changing world can also be addressed by bandit models.
Even if one of the models goes down to receive only 1% of all the
inputs, it may be a good idea to leave it in the mix for a while,
as in few weeks, the initially poorly performing one might be the
one taking the biggest share of inputs. As one respondent put it:
‘‘The world changes, and we know that’’. In addition, introducing
new models to the system was found to be safe in bandit models,
as the new model can be added amongst the others with a small
share of inputs. If the model turns out to be a good one, its share
will rise autonomously over time, and if bad, it will fade away.
Also, a combination of bandit models and some predefined rules,
with certain inputs given to certain models, and all the models
competing for the rest, was suggested.
Voting was considered as a fairly well-known – although not
overly common – method, as only one respondent had not seen
it being used. The respondents were also mostly satisfied with
the voting results they had seen. However, most often the voting
was done as a black-box model with a single input and single
output, with no interfaces to access the model federation inside.
A respondent suggested that voting could be enhanced with a
better mixture of data science and software engineering skills.
Instead of making monolithic models with no transparency, there
are situations in which problems could be split into atomic sub-
problems, each of which could have a specialised model, all of
which would then vote on the outcome. For example, for age
estimation, there could be one model that bases its estimation on
the person’s hair, another for eyes, and a third one for the mouth,
and the age would be referenced based on each one.
Overall, approaches relying on redundancy were seen as some-
thing that should be the aim of many projects. When the project
becomes advanced enough, and the initial model becomes good
enough, the model can be crowned as the ‘‘champion’’ model of
the project. New versions should not replace the champion model
outright, but instead prove themselves to be better over time.
In this way, the project can gather a collection of good quality8
models intrinsically, and this is something many big companies
do in their projects. The goal of the system, however, is important.
If the goal of the system is to make money, then the models can
be used to compete with each other over a longer period of time
to find those that make the most money at every given time. On
the other hand, medical devices do not have the luxury of time,
but should give the best results immediately. Thus, optimising
one, fixed approach to its limits could be a better way to go.
Cost is a challenge with all approaches relying on redun-
dancy. Implementing redundancy always requires money and
time, which many companies – especially new ones – cannot
afford. Even maintaining and optimising one model might be a
task that gets never finished. Two respondents mentioned that
AutoML tools could decrease the costs. The tools could do the
heavy coding for the developers, train numerous different models,
and then hand over the best ones, which could then be used as
redundant models.
Recovery blocks consisting of duplicates of the same model
were widely disregarded as being more suitable for handling
problems in the deployment environment than in the model
itself. Thus, they fall outside the scope of this paper.
5.3.7. Fall-over options
Over the course of the interviews, fall-over procedures were
entioned by the respondents. Essentially, a fall-over means
hat to do when an error is detected. The recovery blocks of the
revious subsection fall into this category as well: when an error
s detected, the input is handed over to another model which acts
s a fall-over component.
The simplest kind of fall-over action to be taken is to alert the
ser or developer. Errors and problematic inputs are flagged, and
he user or developer is informed about the situation. Then, it is
p to the human to decide, what is to come of this. The developer
ay decide to retrain the model, whereas a common user may
ontact the administrator of the system. Thus, the user can play a
art in the quality control of the system. This, of course, requires
hat the user knows they are dealing with an intelligent system.
In the case of problematic inputs or erroneous outputs, the re-
ults can be ignored or filtered out, meaning that if an erroneous
esult is given – e.g., a negative age – it is just not used. This is,
f course, only an option if the rest of the system can function
ithout this information.
Also, one respondent had applied a default output. This means
hat if no acceptable result is given by the model, some prede-
ined, simple output is given to the user. For example, a recom-
endation system of an online media platform should not output
othing, as that would leave the front page empty. Instead, for
xample, the most popular media can be used.
. Discussion
Considering the whimsical nature of ML model misbehaviour,
ombined with the relative immaturity of the field of ML system
evelopment, better understanding and patterns for developing
nd maintaining these systems are called for. This includes pat-
erns for fault tolerance. When it is hard to know, whether or
ot the model is actually working when it is in operation, extra
easures are needed to keep the systems dependable. While
amiliarisation with the skills and good practices of software
ngineering certainly helps, the nature of ML itself must be taken
o account as well. The frameworks and solutions are evolving
s we speak, and the work is not yet done, but we believe we
ave provided conceptualisations for misbehaviour, elaborated
he need and role of fault tolerance, and identified useful patterns
o address different kinds of misbehaviour in ML software.



























































Fig. 1. Concepts of misbehaviour and their placement in relation to the system.
Key findings are:
• ML system can provide poor results if the inputs are of poor
quality, the input–output-pairs do not match, or the input
distribution drifts. This can be caused by a buggy model,
faulty deployment, changes in user base, or misuse of the
models results.
• Interest in fault tolerance is rising but its overall role and
frameworks for it are still developing.
• Some patterns for fault tolerance can be – and already are –
used to tackle the problems caused by the ML model in the
system, despite the field still developing.
.1. Discussion on misbehaviour (RQ1)
For misbehaviour (RQ1), we generalised a set of concepts oc-
urring in ML systems as described in Section 5.1 and illustrated
n Fig. 1. The concepts aim to place the misbehaviour in the
ontext of ML system architecture. The concepts themselves are
uite general but their implications for different kinds of systems
re so vastly different that it would be ill-advised to try to specify
hich deserves most attention from the developers. For example,
ne could argue that systematic errors are always worse than
ndividual ones, but even this might be an overstatement if the
ystematic error does not really reveal itself to the user in a
eaningful way. The severity of an extremely rare or invisible
ystematic error may not be any worse than an extreme indi-
idual error. Thus, the severity depends on factors, such as the
ontext and task of the system.
Considering this, the developers’ awareness of their system
ust be emphasised: if the context and task of the system ba-
ically define the key cases of misbehaviour, the developers must
ake this into consideration. Not only that, but it should also show
n the system itself. For example, if model decay (also known in
he literature as the concept drift Tsymbal, 2004) is recognised as
he key threat to a video recommendation system, the choices
n design should aim to mitigate that instead of trying to catch
very last poor recommendation. In this case, this could mean
mplementing redundant models as a multi-armed bandit instead
f the models voting on every output. The opposite could be true
or a brain tumour detection system, as human brains should be
uite similar to each other, but as many erroneous outputs should
e prevented as possible. t
9
6.2. Discussion on the role of fault tolerance (RQ2)
Just as with misbehaviour, also the need for and role of fault
tolerance (RQ2) was deemed to be highly contextual and, thus,
varying. Not only that, but the relative immaturity of the field
and lack of best practices make it difficult to conclusively assess
what the role should be. Thus, the problem is tightly inter-
twined with the development of the discipline. We believe that
clearer, proven patterns for risk assessment, model deployment,
and systemmaintenance would tighten the gap between software
engineers and data scientists, greatly benefit developers as well
as customers — and actually establish the role of fault tolerance
for ML systems.
Typically, the respondents expressed that they would pre-
fer that ML software projects were treated more like software
projects and fault tolerance and dependability received more
attention. This suggests that the respondents are not satisfied
with how dependability is taken into account in the projects. ML
software projects become bigger and more business-critical, and
their trustworthiness should be addressed all the way through
the project, even if the role of fault tolerance is still undeveloped
in the process.
6.3. Discussion on the patterns for fault tolerance (RQ3)
The different patterns of fault tolerance (RQ3) have different
capabilities to address each type of misbehaviour. The refined
patterns based on the study proposals that were considered ap-
plicable in the case study along with their pros, cons and when
to use are summarised in Table 2.
Hard limits on inputs are efficient in preventing unwanted
input–output pairs and poor-quality inputs from entering the
model — if you know what you are looking for. Not all erroneous
nputs are actually that harmful. This, combined with the fact that
L models that go into production are usually highly accurate
ith inputs similar to those in their training data, makes it
ften tedious to find the malign inputs. Moreover, hard limits
o not really work to prevent problems caused by drift in input
istribution, as the change in distribution does not necessarily
ean changes in single inputs in the sense of breaking the limits.
hus, hard limits are usually recommended for limiting inputs
o obey business rules, grouping rare inputs into one through,
or example, limiting very big or very small inputs to predefined
axima, and clear-cut apparent cases of poor-quality inputs.
Novelty input checker, in turn, could help in observing
hether a change in input distribution is happening. However,
his is only true if the drift in the distribution brings in formerly
nseen inputs, instead of drifting within the same limits. Finding
ew kinds of inputs is better suited for finding data that was
issing in the training data and to improve it — or potentially find
ew kinds of ways the inputs can be corrupted. Thus, compared
ith hard limits, novelty input checker has potential to be a more
onstructive tool.
The drift in input data distribution can be observed knowingly,
nd thus, shield the model against possible decay. Not only that,
ut with systems working within naturally changing environ-
ents, like possibly evolving user demographics, it is highly
ecommended and common, based on the interviews. In addi-
ion, skewing statistics can indicate problems in input sources.
or example, observing the development of average, standard
eviation, and other statistical indicators of the inputs over a
atch or a certain period of time, and how they move away from
heir original values can indicate an upcoming prolapse in the
erformance of the model. This pattern was brought up by every
espondent, even though it was not in the study propositions. This
eavily indicates that the initial propositions did not present a full
axonomy.


















A summary of patterns.
Pattern Variant Pros Cons When to use
Input checker Hard limits Efficient in enforcing business
rules and preventing poor




knowledge of the model. May
solve only small problems.
When accuracy of single
outputs is vital, and holey or
out-of-range inputs cause
problems.
Novelty inputs Shows holes in – and can be
later utilised as – training data.
Difficult to say when a novel
input is a problem.




Indicates changes in operations
environment, and possible
need of retraining.
Does not prevent single errors
from happening.
In naturally evolving or
changing input distributions.
When input sources are prone
to problems.
Output checker Hard limits Efficient in enforcing business





knowledge of the domain and
system. Careless use leads to
limiting results.
When business rules or safety
regulations dictate a range of
acceptable results, or
unacceptable outputs can




Indicates changes in operations
environment, and possible
need of retraining.
Does not prevent single errors
from happening.
In naturally evolving or
changing input distributions.





development in a continuously
learning model.
Better suited for development
phase and monitoring HW
problems.
When testing the system after
model deployment.
Activation observers Has potential in spotting
erroneous input–output pairs.
Knowledge claims based on
our data cannot be made.




Requires knowledge on when




When high dependability is
required, and other fall-over
solutions are too simple for
the problem.
Input switch Allows the best suited model
to be used for each input.
Requires an enormous amount
of knowledge about input
space and used models.
Requires several models.
When inputs can be in several
forms or types, or inputs
contain several sub-problems.
Multi-armed bandit Raises tolerance against
changes in data distribution.
Allows safer introduction of
new models.
Requires several models. In naturally evolving or
changing input spaces. If
product maturity has
introduced several iterations of
models.





When sufficient data science
skills are present in the
project.
Fall-over options Allow simpler, more
predictable outcomes when
errors are detected. Either
brings in the user or developer
to solve the problem, or
handles situations consistently.
Low cost.
Results may not be as
sophisticated as with finer
solutions or models.
Often, if not always, as the last
resort.Limiting outputs with hard limits has similar qualities to lim-
ting inputs. They cannot indicate much about changes happening
n the data. Instead, they can enforce business rules effectively, as
ell as filtering out absurd results: an autonomous system prob-
bly should not be able to grant a loan of millions of euros, nor
an anyone be less than zero years old. In addition, safety rules
an be enforced using hard limits, for example, by preventing an
utonomous controller of a machine from surpassing safe levels
f torque or heat. Also, outputs filled with missing values, or other
ndications of clear errors can be monitored. However, one should
pproach hard limits with caution: having too many limitations
n outputs can actually corrode the model, as too strict limitation
an actually narrow down the results to exactly what was initially
xpected, thus harming the generalising possibilities.
Changes in the distribution of outputs can also be a sign of the
orld changing around the model, similarly to input distribution.
ccording to the interviews, this is a very useful tool, if you can
ccess the output data.
10As for redundancy, recovery blocks with divergent models
seems useful as a fall-over procedure if there are ways to recog-
nise undesired outputs. As such, it should pair well with output
checkers. However, it is costly, and deemed heavy, thus limiting
its usefulness. Deciding the used model beforehand by some rules
based on knowledge of the problem at hand, and the models’
capabilities to handle different sub-problems is another way to
organise redundancy. This would limit problems related to un-
expected input–output pairs, as the used model should probably
be chosen based on the highest accuracy of the specific kinds of
inputs. This could also mitigate problems with data distribution
drifts, as long as the distribution mostly stays within the strong
areas of the models. However, the extensive knowledge required
to implement such a system makes large-scale usage impractical.
It is probably recommendable to limit the usage to clear cases,
such as when a certain model performs better when some input
values are absent, or if a certain model performs well with specific
sub-problems.






























































Bandit models with constantly adjusting weights is an ef-
icient way of battling drift in input data distribution, as the
est-performing models always gain more ground. In this way,
he most suitable models for the current state of the environment
vertake the decaying ones. Also, the possibility of adding new
odels into the federation mitigates the risks in two out of three
f the possible sources of misbehaviour: adding a buggy model
r accidentally implementing the new model poorly does not
mmediately break the whole system, as the new model gets
uffocated by the better-performing models. However, bandit
odels are also costly, as is any other design with multiple
odels. Also, using bandit models requires some metric to be
ptimised: there has to be some way of measuring the success of
ach model. This comes naturally to some systems, for example,
y registering whether or not the user clicks a recommended
roduct or even buys it, but might not be easy or even possible
or some. In addition, compared with choosing the model used
ased on prior knowledge, adjusting the weights takes time. If
he metrics can be measured, bandit models, possibly combined
ith some predefined rules, have major advantages for tolerating
hanges in the world around the models, without having to have
xtensive knowledge of the models’ strengths beforehand.
Voting is complicated. Multi-agent models and other ensemble
odels have successfully used different forms of voting to uplift
heir accuracy. However, this is often the inner workings of a
ingle, monolithic model, instead of a federation of models with
ndividual inputs and outputs. At best, the models cover each
ther’s weaknesses, and, through voting, mitigate the amount
f undesired outputs. Making sure this actually happens instead
f amplifying the shortcomings, however, requires skills in data
cience, and can be a tedious task, not to mention – again – the
ost of developing multiple models. A federation of models voting
n the output is probably well-suited to raising the accuracy
f the system, i.e., reducing surprising input–output pairs, and
uppressing broken models as they get outvoted, but seems like
difficult and costly approach if the project lacks data science
kills.
Observing a model’s inner workings through node activations
s interesting, and its inclusion in some high-level libraries sug-
ests it has potential. Alas, the details remained so scarce that we
are not make any more detailed suggestions on its usage without
urther research on the subject. Other model observers, as well as
ecovery blocks with duplicating models, are useful in their own
ight, but not so much in the context of this study.
Of course, patterns can be applied simultaneously. Some pat-
erns overlap, and may not work together that well. For example,
mplementing multiple forms of redundancy sounds like a tedious
nd costly task, if it can be done in the first place; implementing
oting models and recovery blocks in the same system sounds
ery difficult, as they both involve dealing with multiple, if not
ll deployed models in a very different manner. However, not all
atterns overlap or even touch the same components. It would
ake sense that the same system had one pattern for inputs,
nother for outputs, and some redundancy, if each of them is
een as useful and implementable in the system. Moreover, some
ort of fall-over option should probably be implemented in every
ystem.
Taking the idea a step further, different patterns could be used
o support each other, as different patterns are effective against
ifferent kinds of misbehaviour. If concept drift is deemed to be
he biggest threat to the system, it does not sound unreasonable
o observe the input and output distributions and implement
multi-armed bandit to supplement each other in the task.
ikewise, if input and output checkers and voting models can be
mplemented, they could potentially supplement each other in an
ffort to minimise the amount of erroneous results.
11Not all forms of redundancy rule each other out. An interesting
idea would be having certain cases for which predefined rules
would steer specific kinds of inputs to specialised models, while
dealing with most of the inputs using bandit models or voting.
In this way, the system can benefit from prior, explicit knowl-
edge, as well as the implicit knowledge provided by the whole
orchestra.
Many of the patterns bear a resemblance to patterns for fault
tolerance in traditional software (Knight, 2012). They usually do,
however, have a ML-specific twist to them. For example, inputs
and outputs are not necessarily limited because the values are
known to be erroneous or dangerous, but because the values are
known to be problematic in relation to certain business rules,
or too rare in the training data to be trusted. Also, some have
not risen directly from traditional concepts, and are very much
based on the basics of ML. For example, observing inputs for
changes in distributions or possible novel inputs are based on the
threats of concept drift and incomplete training data. Some have
traditional and ML-specific implications: using bandit models not
only establishes which model functions best in the context when
implemented, but also protects the system from concept drift, as
the most suitable model for the moment will emerge on top.
Overall, we have presented a set of patterns for the fault
tolerance of ML systems (Table 2). To our knowledge, this is the
first attempt to synthesise such a set. The patterns are gathered
from experiences of experienced practitioners, refined from the
initial model (see Section 3) through adding, detailing, and re-
jecting patterns. Thus, scarce, anecdotal information from earlier
research has been clarified in context, while supplementing it
with new patterns and new information on how to utilise pat-
terns inspired by traditional fault tolerance. The patterns have
different strengths and shortcomings, while each is also more
suitable for addressing certain problems better than others. Thus,
even though the field and role of fault tolerance is still immature,
and the set may not be complete, we believe the patterns to be
useful for addressing different, actual problems when building ML
systems in different contexts.
7. Validity
We base our validity discussion on the work of Shadish et al.
(2002). Since we carried out a case study as a form of qualitative
study and did not make statistical conclusions, we focus only on
the internal, construct, and external validity.
Internal validity means the validity of causality: do the treat-
ment and the outcome actually reflect the causality between
them? In this paper, this would mean whether or not the pre-
sented architectural designs actually promote fault tolerance. The
respondents were asked to elaborate on what kind of misbe-
haviour they have witnessed pertaining to ML software based on
the general description of faults and errors, and asked how these
problems were addressed in the software. Furthermore, consid-
ering the case propositions, the respondents were not only asked
whether they saw the propositions’ potential, but also whether
they had actually used something similar themselves, or would.
Also, the respondents were not hesitant to reject propositions or
suggest alterations.
Construct validity means the validity of conceptualisation and
theoretical generalisation, i.e., are the concepts properly defined
and understood? A prevalent problem in interview-based studies
is whether the respondents understand what the interviewer
meant, and vice versa. To tackle this problem, the central con-
cepts were explained to the respondents at the beginning of every
interview, the slides were shown to help everyone to follow the
interview, and the descriptions of case propositions were backed
up by diagrams of the proposed design shown in the slides. As
















































several respondents gave similar answers and similar suggestions,
and also outright rejected some propositions as not relevant to
the described situation, we believe the concepts were clear for the
respondents. On the other hand, to mitigate the threat that we
as researchers misunderstood the respondents, two interview-
ers were always present at each interview, the interviews were
recorded and the recordings were used in the analysis, forming a
chain of evidence, and we gave the respondents an opportunity
to review a draft of this manuscript. Another threat to construct
validity is that many of the proposed cases stem from experiences
in traditional software engineering; thus, they might be out of
place in the world of ML systems. However, the respondents were
ready to reject propositions they found not to be useful concepts
in the field at hand.
External validity refers to the generalisability of the results. A
hreat to external validity in qualitative studies pertains to the
election of the respondents for the study. First, the respondents
ight share similar views because of commonalities in their
ackground and projects they have participated in. Second, all
he respondents work for organisations in Finland, which gives a
eographically and culturally limited selection. Third, the number
f respondents was five, which can be considered quite low. How-
ver, the respondents have different educational backgrounds,
nd have worked for a range of organisations, for example, in
tart-ups, big media companies, and – to a smaller extent –
cademia. The organisations and their business environments are
ctually relatively international, at least focusing on European
arkets. Also, despite the number of respondents, their responses
ere not limited to a single project, but they were allowed to
raw from their experiences as a whole. This could be seen in
he fact that respondents used a wide variety of examples in their
esponses, and often suggested that some case propositions might
e useful in contexts they usually did not use as examples. The
ariety in the examples could suggest a good variety in the appli-
ability. Of course, this does not mean that the suggested patterns
ould work in all cases, nor does it mean that they cover all the
ossibilities even in the explicitly mentioned situations. That is,
he results as the outcome of a case study are not statistically
epresentative or a necessarily full taxonomy. However, as the
esponses saturated along with the interviews, we believe we
ave gathered a fairly good body of knowledge on the current
tate of the field.
. Conclusions
We have presented a case study on the fault tolerance and
isbehaviour of software systems utilising ML. The results were
rawn from five semi-structured interviews with experienced
rchitects from the industry. The need for established frameworks
or ML software engineering is on the rise as ML models are being
eployed in more and more business-critical and autonomous
nvironments. This is not limited to fault tolerance, but also other
hases in the life-cycle of ML software. The more direct conse-
uences the system has for the life of the user, the more care
hould be taken when ensuring the dependability of the system.
owever, as the field is still quite immature, fault tolerance is still
rying to find its place. Some patterns are used in the industry, but
ractitioners and customers often do not consider the ML system
s a complete software engineering project with a need for fault
olerance. Regarding misbehaviour and fault tolerance, our study
lso emphasised the consideration of ML system’s context.
The currently applied patterns for the fault tolerance of ML
ystems can be roughly divided into input and output checking,
ata distribution observing, redundancy, fall-over options, and
heir sub-patterns. Input and output checking and autonomous
rchestration of inputs to the most suitable redundant models12were the most used designs to detect errors and prevent them
from propagating. Voting is also a useful solution for this. Redun-
dant models as recovery blocks, along with default outputs and
other fall-over options, are used for error recovery when an error
is detected. Data distribution observers and bandit models are
highly regarded as tools to keep the models relevant, even in the
face of the world changing around the systems. Model observers
deserve further research.
These are hardly the only ways to build fault-tolerant ML sys-
tems, and this is just the first attempt to gather this information.
The field is young, and as frameworks for the development of
these systems are tuned further, fault-tolerance patterns will no
doubt find their place and have their share of development.
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